Why does Uddyotakara think that a defender of the "No Self" Thesis is unable to explain how Memory and recognition work? Does his argument refute the "No Self" Thesis?

Question 1 Why does Uddyotakara think that a defender of the "No Self" Thesis is unable to explain how Memory and recognition work? Does his argument refute the "No Self" Thesis? 

The concept of the No Self thesis has long been debated and discussed in the fields of philosophy and psychology. In refuting the No Self Thesis, Uddyotakara argues based on Vātsyāyana's argument who states that the existence of self is based on memory and recognition.  According to Vātsyāyana's, the self is an enduring entity that persists over time, and is recognized and remembered through memory (Chakrabarti, 1999, 59). Upon recalling or recognizing an event or object, he argues that only a persistent self with past experience of the event or object allows us to do so. In contrast, Vasubandhu one of defenders of the No Self Thesis disagrees with Vātsyāyana's claim. In Vasubandhu's view, the self consists merely of a series of constantly changing mental and physical elements, with no enduring entity that persists over time (Duerlinger, 2003, Pg. 71). He argues that our sense of self is an illusion created by our ignorance and attachment. In his argument against the No Self thesis, Uddyotakara an Indian philosopher, argues that its defenders fail to explain how memory and recognition operate. Therefore, I will explore Uddyotakara's argument in this essay, and determine whether it refutes the No Self thesis. 

Based on Vātsyāyana's argument, a self is required for memory and recognition (Chakrabarti, 1999, Pg 58). He describes memory as the capacity to recall past events, and recognition as the ability to recognize things that are familiar to the self. Neither memory nor recognition can exist without the presence of a subject who has experienced and remembered past events. It is believed by Uddyotakara that the subject perceiving the world at present must be the same subject who remembers and recognizes. There can therefore be no memory or recognition if there is no self. 

Uddyotakara's challenged the No Self thesis by citing that Memory has a role in remembering and recalling, a concept complicated to the self. As seen by his hypothesis about Memory, Uddyotakara's argument was based on the relationship between cause and effect (Chakrabarti, 1999, Pg. 62). He maintains that despite the fact that every person possesses both cognitions, there is no self-identical recognition of both, and hence the defenders of the No Self cannot agree that a person can have a memory of previous events. Because an individual cannot remember anything about the past if they have a different cognition of the event, this weakens the “No Self” thesis account of memory. Because it requires effort to recall information from past events, remembering must also have a basis which is Memory. Thus, since the self serves as the foundation of memory, and then there must exist a self from the act of remembering. 

The “No Self” thesis, according to Uddyotakara, cannot explain the phenomenon of memory and recognition. It’s important to note that recognizing something as familiar or well-known is different from remembering it. Memory is the capacity to store information about the past and recall it later (Kapstein, 2001, 379). Both of these skills assume the presence of a self or subject that endures over time and has the capacity to remember and recognize the events of the past. These events would not be possible without a self because there would be no one to remember or identify anything. To illustrate this, Uddyotakara gives the example of someone who sees a cow and then realizes that it is the same cow they previously saw. The "No Self" thesis claims that there is no persistent self that can be distinguished from the person who first saw the cow and the person who afterwards identified it. This perspective, however, is at odds with how we typically conceive personal identity, which presupposes that the same person who first saw the cow is also the one who later identifies it. Uddyotakara contends that in order to recognize the existence of a permanent self or subject, we must reject the "No Self" theory. 

Moreover, Uddyotakara points out that reliable sources can attest to the self’s existence. The earlier and later cognitions are still distinct, according to Uddyotakara, despite the causal relationship. He further argued that cognitive synthesis is founded on the relation of cause and effect (Das, nd, Pg 11.). The awareness that the same person has both cognitions cannot be accurate as long as the two cognitions are distinct and there is no self-identical cognition of both. Even the Buddhists agree that there cannot be any recognition synthesis without a difference. In other words, even the Buddhists acknowledge that they cannot claim the experiences of others as their own. The fact that the earlier and later cognitions have the same type of object is discerned through Memory. 

Uddyotakara asserts that even though the previous state may have caused the final form, it is still a separate state and cannot be aware that it has the same object (Taber, 2016, Pg. 99). If there is a permanent Self that is distinct from the shifting forms, the problem does not exist. Nevertheless, the issue still exists if the Self is denied because cognitions are transient. It is only known for anything permanent to have the desire. Since the cognition of Memory may be something non-existent, it is impossible to rely on the integrity of the Memory and that Memory cannot enable rational thought because the recall of an absent event cannot establish its existence. This is due to the fact that the two states of cognition are incompatible with one another since they are not contemporaneous, and as a result, there is no contemporary relationship for recognition. 

Uddyotakara's observation that every activity has a foundation, including memory, raises important questions about the nature of the self and its role in the process of remembering. According to Uddyotakara, memory cannot be explained solely by the defenders of the No Self thesis, as there must be a distinct self that serves as the basis or foundation for the recalled action. (Taber, 2016, Pg. 99). In the absence of the Self, it is not possible to recall. This renders the argument of the No Self thesis invalid, which claims the object of memory cannot support the existence of the Self. Uddyotakara further points out that every remembering requires support making the relationship between the Self and memory necessary. 

According to Uddyotakara, memory and recognition depend on a continuous, stable self (Taber, 2016, Pg. 109). Therefore, the “self” must be indistinguishable from itself in the past, present, and future. In the absence of a self, there is no continuity, and there is no possibility of memory or recognition. Furthermore, Uddyotakara concludes that no personal identity or responsibility can be established without a “self.”  As such, no moral agency exists without a self, and no consequences can be derived from our actions. 

Uddyotakara criticizes this notion because it fails to explain how two fleeting thoughts that are not contemporaneous are linked for recognition. Instead, he offers another explanation for the existence of a Self on which Memory is dependent in which he mentions that recalling pain or pleasure marks the start of self since recognizing such events requires memory (Kapstein, 2001, Pg. 378). Thus, pleasure and pain senses have multiple causes since they are recognized as belonging to the self with the aid of Memory. Various environmental factors influence color, taste, and other sense perceptions. They would not have been identified as belonging to the same person if they had not been captured by the same agent, that is, the self. A shared agent (self) that influences many perceptions at various periods must therefore be permanent. 

Clearly, Uddyotakara's argument is a strong challenge to the No Self Thesis. Although his argument assumes a particular concept of self, it is important to note that all proponents of the "No Self" thesis do not share this conception. According to the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, as an example of a defender of the "No Self" thesis, the self is devoid of inherent existence (Westerhoff, 2007, Pg. 24). Therefore, the self is not an independent, permanent entity, but rather depends on other factors and arises from them. In Nagarjuna's view, “the self” is like a reflection in a mirror or an echo. 

Moreover, defenders of the “No Self” thesis counter that Uddyotakara's argument ignores the possibility of a functional self that is based on both mental and physical processes. Based on this view, the self is not a fixed, unchanging entity, but rather a constantly evolving process that arises and ceases based on a variety of causes and conditions (Kapstein, 2001, Pg. 378). As a mental construct or fiction, the functional self serves as the mechanism by which everyday life runs smoothly, without ever being connected to any underlying reality. 

However, it might be argued against Uddyotakara's claim that a permanent self is necessary to understand memory and recognition. Several theories of memory and recognition that are in line with the "No Self" concept have been put forth by Buddhist philosophers. For instance, according to the Yogacara school of Buddhism, memory is a type of mental imprinting in which past events leave a mark or a seed in the mind that can later be triggered by the right stimuli (Tola & Dragonetti, 2005, Pg. 1). According to this perspective, recognition is the activation of these mental seeds rather than the actual perception of an outside object. This theory proposes a continuation of mental states and processes rather than the need for a permanent self. Another possible objection to Uddyotakara's argument is that memory and recognition do not necessarily require a self. In cognitive terms, memory and recognition are processes that occur with no fixed, permanent identity. As one example, cognitive scientists have demonstrated that memory and recognition can be understood within the context of neural networks and information processing. This view suggests that memory and recognition aren't dependent on self, but rather on brain and nervous system functioning. 

Furthermore, some modern philosophers contend that Uddyotakara's justification is based on an unpopular theory of memory and recognition. For instance, according to philosopher John Locke, memory is a collection of distinct mental occurrences rather than a continuous stream of consciousness (Nimbalkar, 2011, Pg. 268). In Locke’s view, the self isn’t necessary for memory and recognition because these processes can take place without a continuous and unchanging entity. 

In conclusion, Uddyotakara's critique of the "No Self" thesis is based on the idea that self-awareness is necessary for memory and recognition. According to him, recognition is impossible without a self since there would be no agent to carry out the process of comparing current perceptions to earlier memories. Yet, there are several interpretations of the "No Self" thesis that allow for memory and recognition without a self, therefore his argument does not necessarily disprove it. In addition, some modern philosophers contend that Uddyotakara's position is predicated on an unpopular theory of memory and recognition.  Memory, according to Locke, is a series of discrete mental events rather than a continuous stream of consciousness. Thus, Locke views that the self doesn't need to exist for memory and recognition to occur because these processes can occur without existing as an unchanging and continuous entity. Vasubandhu also argues against Uddyotakara’s argument refuting the “No Self” thesis. According to him memory and recognition are possible as a result of the interaction between several physical and mental factors. Additionally, Nagarjuna, who defends the "No Self" thesis, argued that the self doesn't exist inherently. This means that the self exists as a result of other factors rather than being an independent, permanent entity. As such, it is clear that Uddyotakara's reasoning is thought-provoking, but it is by no means definitive, and thus the debate about Uddyotakara's "No Self" thesis continues. 

References

Chakrabarti, K. K. (1999). Classical Indian philosophy of mind: The Nyaya dualist tradition. State University of New York Press. 

Duerlinger, J. (2003). Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: Vasubandhu's Refutation of the Theory of a Self. Routledge. 

Das, N. (n.d). Uddyotakara on the Persistence of the Self. University College London. 

Kapstein, M. (2001). Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought. 

Simon and Schuster. Taber, J. (2016). Uddyotakara's Defense of the Self. In Hindu and Buddhist ideas in dialogue (pp. 97-114). Routledge. 

Nimbalkar, N. (2011). John Locke on personal identity. Mens sana monographs, 9(1), 268. 

Tola, F., & Dragonetti, C. (2005). Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school. History of psychiatry, 16(4), 453-465.