Ian Hacking’s Contingency Argument

Ian Hacking’s Contingency Argument

Introduction: 

Based on chapter three of Ian Hacking’s book, “The Social Construction of What?’” I will critically asses the success of Hacking’s contingency argument. The main problem under examination is the objectivist view of scientific knowledge and its claim to represent objective truths about the natural world. The contingency argument challenges the objectivist stance by highlighting the historical and social factors that influence scientific classifications and concepts. In a step-by-step reconstruction and evaluation, I will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the contingency argument to determine assess the success of the contingency argument. 

Reconstruction of the Contingency Argument: 

The objectivist view posits that scientific categories and classifications are objective and reflect inherent properties of the natural world. According to objectivism, scientific concepts, such as atoms, molecules, and subatomic particles, exist independently of human observation or cognition. Hacking (1999) assumes an example of a nucleus atom where he states that “…let me take for example the nucleus of the atom, without which there is no nuclear bomb” (Hacking, 1999, p. 171).   In this example, we can note that the concept of the atomic nucleus, which is crucial for understanding nuclear weapons and reactions, gradually emerged as a real possibility through scientific investigation and empirical evidence. It implies that the nucleus of the atom was not thinkable or conceptualized as a specific entity before the experimental evidence and theoretical developments presented it as a viable option. Therefore, as researchers postulated the existence of electrons and conducted experiments, the idea of an atomic nucleus became a possibility and eventually a known fact. This progression aligns with the objectivist view that scientific knowledge is based on objective evidence and is not fixed or predetermined. 

Yet, Hacking's contingency argument challenges this perspective by highlighting the inherent human involvement in the process of scientific inquiry. He contends that classifications and categories used in science are not inherent in nature but rather depend on cultural norms, language, and historical context. Hacking argues that scientific categories emerge through what he refers to as “interactive kinds." To illustrate “interactive kinds” Hacking uses an example of a “woman refugee” as a form of classification. He states that “The ‘‘woman refugee’’ (as a kind of classification) can be called an interactive kind because it interacts with things of that kind, namely people, including individual women refugees, who can become aware of how they are classified and modify their behavior accordingly” (Hacking, 1999, p. 32). This shows how scientific classifications can actively shape the phenomena they seek to describe. These are categories that gain their stability and definition through ongoing interactions between researchers, technologies, and the natural world. As scientific practices evolve, so do the categories themselves, making them contingent upon the specific historical and social conditions in which they arise. 

Successes of the Contingency Argument: 

Firstly, among the strongest aspects of the contingency argument is its ability to reveal the historical context in which scientific facts emerge. Several case studies are highlighted by Hacking to demonstrate how scientific categories and entities are not fixed but evolve over time. A notable example of case studies is when he explores the concept of multiple personality disorder, illustrating how its definition and diagnosis transformed under the influence of various social and cultural factors. Hacking mentions in his article that “Other mental illnesses are what I call transient” (Hacking, 1999, p. 100). He adds that, “…they show up only at some times and some places, for reasons which we can only suppose are connected with the culture of those times and places” (Hacking, 1999, p. 100). He gives an example of anorexia in which young women can die as a result of the disease. Additionally, he states that “… is quite local in its history; at present it is more virulent in Argentina than anywhere else” (Hacking, 1999, p. 100).  This historical contextualization of scientific knowledge reveals the subjective and dynamic nature of objectivity, undermining the objectivist claim of absolute and timeless truth. 

Secondly, Hacking's emphasis on the social construction of scientific categories challenges the objectivist claim that these categories are universal and objective. He illustrates how scientific classifications, such as race and gender, are products of specific historical and cultural contexts rather than being inherent in nature (Hacking, 1999, p. 87). By exposing the social processes that give rise to scientific categories, the contingency argument successfully weakens the objectivist assumption of objective categories in science. 

Limitations of Contingency Argument: 

Although Hacking examines how concepts and categories can change over time due to social and historical factors, the argument does not provide a clear criterion for evaluating the validity of alternative conceptual frameworks. The indeterminacy of concepts raises questions about how to distinguish legitimate revisions of scientific knowledge from arbitrary changes influenced by social or political agendas. Another objection to the argument from interactive classification might propose that while scientific classifications can influence phenomena to some extent, this doesn’t disprove the underlying objectivity of the entities themselves. Critics could argue that interactive classification highlights the dynamic relationship between scientific practice and the natural world, rather than negating the existence of an objective reality. 

Conclusion: 

In chapter three of "The Social Construction of What?" the contingency argument presented by Ian Hacking successfully challenges the objectivist view of scientific knowledge by highlighting the dynamic and contingent nature of scientific categories. The argument emphasizes the important contribution of social interactions, historical settings, and human behaviors to the formation of scientific knowledge. The contingency argument is criticized for its propensity for relativism and the nature of objectivity, despite its advantages. It also encounters difficulties when applied to certain scientific domains. Nevertheless, the argument remains a thought-provoking and influential contribution to the philosophy of science, urging scientists and philosophers alike to reconsider the relationship between language, social context, and the construction of scientific knowledge.    

References

Hacking, I. (1999). The social construction of what? Harvard university press.