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Radicalization Models

A radicalization process has several steps and is not something that takes place overnight. Transformation can come about due to a variety of factors in an individual's life. Similarly, people can also become de-radicalized and leave terrorist organizations through different methods and factors. Many programs have been implemented worldwide, including in the United States, that have been designed to de-radicalize people and turn them away from terrorism. Violent extremism (VE), in its emergence and spread, as well as the evolution of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) continue to pose a complex and global threat (King & Taylor, 2011). However, to fully comprehend the origins of violent radicalization, it's crucial to understand that terrorist groups are composed of different types of disaffected individuals who undergo varying paths of radicalization. This paper analyzes and compares two different approaches to radicalization, as well as summarizes the factors that can lead someone to disengage from terrorist activities and the programs available to support counter-radicalization. 

For monitoring radicalization, there are five major models widely accepted. Among them are Borum's Pathway, Wiktorowicz's Theory of Joining Extremist Groups, Sageman's Four Prongs, Moghaddam's Stairway to Terrorism, and The NYPD's Radicalization Process. The essay compares and contrasts the Borum Pathway and Sageman's Four Prongs. All these models are evaluated using “a review of theoretical models and social psychological evidence on the radicalization of homegrown jihadists” by Michael King and Donald Taylor discuss and evaluates all of these models. In the first instance, the main contrast is between the models themselves and the bases upon which they are built. While Borum's Pathway discusses radicalization more widely among countries outside the West, Sageman's Four Prongs also includes factors pertaining to the challenges of multiculturalism in Western societies (King & Taylor, 2011). Similarly, Borum's model identifies radicalization as a multiphase process with a linear progression, and Sageman's model outlines four constant variables that can occur at any time (Chuang & D'Orsogna, 2019). Essentially, Borum's Pathway goes as follows: “it is wrong, it is unfair, it's your fault, and violence follows” (Chuang & D'Orsogna, 2019). In the first step, it's not right, there's a disliking of one's condition. The second step, “it's not fair”, reflects the moment when a person views their own situation as unjust or unequal. A third step is when a person starts to blame their circumstances on an outside group and tries to target the group directly. During step four, which is violence, the person acts against the group they believe is to blame for their situation. 

In contrast to Borum's Pathway, Sageman's Four Prongs explain how people become radicalized. According to Sageman's model, radicalization involves four factors, but it may occur in any order or at any time (Borum, 2011). Based on Sageman's models, moral outrage, frame of mind, resonance with personal experience, and network mobilization are among the four factors of radicalization. Firstly, depending on the individual's moral convictions, moral outrage can be any event viewed as a violation of their values. The second factor, frame of mind, describes how one views the world. A third factor, resonance with personal experience, can arise when a person can see an occurrence happen to someone and also violate his/her moral expectations. The fourth factor, “mobilization through networks,” occurs when the individual is assisted to radicalize by those who share his or her values. The first three of these factors fall under the category of cognitive factors. Moreover, the fourth factor constitutes the sole factor that takes place outside of one's own mind. The fourth factor of Sageman's model is the most crucial since it is through how the person connects with others that the person becomes radicalized completely. Additionally, it’s important to note that the fourth factor can happen over the internet rather than in person. 

As opposed to the previous models that focused on radicalization, the following factors and models attempt to accomplish the opposite - in other words, to de-radicalize someone. Similar to radicalization, there are a number of factors that contribute to someone's de-radicalization, both psychologically and behaviorally. In their book “Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology”, Mary Altier, John Horgan, and Christian Thoroughgood referred to these factors as push and pull factors (Altier et al., 2014). Within terrorist organizations, those factors which force people away are known as Push factors (Altier et al., 2014). The most common factors include unmet expectations, lack of faith in philosophy, frustration with tactics or strategy, disillusionment with personnel, a difficult lifestyle of clandestine operatives, inability to deal with violence, a decline in faith, and burnout. Pull factors, on the other hand, occur outside the terrorist organization and tend to withdraw individuals from it (Shaffer, 2014). A few of these factors may include competition for loyalty, job or education opportunities, family demands and desires, and positive interactions with moderates. Therefore, people can be influenced by multiple push/pull factors at any time and none of the factors or combination of the factors can affect an individual. Thus, considering these factors is crucial when you consider deradicalization and counter-radicalization models since at any given time chances of effectiveness can be increased. 

There are two methods of turning someone away from terrorism: de-radicalization and counter-radicalization. However, they approach the concept differently. The two models are covered in detail in Dr. Farhan Zahid's “Analyzing The Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Models”. An act of de-radicalization seeks to change a person's attitude and beliefs that enable them to justify extremism. While countering radicalization means preventing extremist values and traits from ever taking hold. In Dr. Zahid's view, counter-radicalization is more effective than de-radicalization when it is used effectively (Zahid 2016). A number of counter-radicalization programs have been implemented in different parts of the world. The United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands have all adopted such programs (Vidino, 2020). By introducing extremists to the societies of their host countries, the programs aim to limit the possibility that they might become radicalized. 

As for de-radicalization, there are four different models. The Saudi Model, Yemeni     De-radicalization Program, Indonesian Initiative, and Egyptian Program are the four models included in de-radicalization. Despite their differences, they all function in the same way, though each one is uniquely tailored to the terrorist region where it operates. In the program, religious texts are used to deradicalize people and turn their views in the opposite direction (Koehler, 2015). These programs seek to de-radicalize individuals by use of the same religious material that draws terrorists to extremism in these regions. Funding and manpower are both significant costs associated with both types of methods making it a challenge to implement. Zahid affirms this by from his statement that “Terrorism is considered as the weapon of the weak and in most of the cases requires few resources; on the other hand, counter-terrorism is a pretty expensive activity” (Zahid 2016).  Unfortunately, the countries that most need these programs lack access to resources to effectively combat terrorism.

In conclusion, the paper presented two models for radicalizing people, compared and contrasted how one might become radicalized, and reviewed the factors leading to disengagement from terrorist activities as well as the programs that can counter-radicalize. Sageman's Four Prongs and Borum's Pathway were discussed. In order to combat radicalization, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization, substantial funding and manning are required all over the world. Similarly, push and pull factors can lead someone from extremism either as a result of behavioral or psychological reasons.          

References 

Altier, M. B., Thoroughgood, C. N., & Horgan, J. G. (2014). Turning away from terrorism. Journal of Peace Research, 51(5), 647–661. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314535946 Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism ii: A review of conceptual models and empirical research. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 37–62. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.2 

Chuang, Y. L., & D'Orsogna, M. R. (2019). Mathematical models of radicalization and terrorism. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.08485. 

King, M., & Taylor, D. M. (2011). The radicalization of homegrown jihadists: A review of theoretical models and social psychological evidence. Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(4), 602–622. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.587064 

Koehler, D. (2015). De-radicalization and disengagement programs as counter-terrorism and prevention tools. Insights from field experiences regarding German right-wing extremism and jihadism. Countering radicalisation and violent extremism among youth to prevent terrorism, 118, 120-150. 

Shaffer, R. (2014). Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (Eds.).Leaving Terrorism BEHIND: Individual and COLLECTIVE DISENGAGEMENT. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(5), 857–859. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.968029 

Vidino, L. (2010). Countering Radicalization in America:. US Institute of Peace. 

Zahid, F. (2016 December) Analyzing the Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Models. Retrieved 28 May 2020 from https://cf2r.org/foreign/analyzing-the-counter- radicalization-and-de-radicalization-models-2/