Examination of Self-Concept Challenges Traditional Views

 Examination of Self-Concept Challenges Traditional Views

In the discipline of philosophy and psychology, numerous debates have been raised on the concept of the self in philosophy. The concept itself is very complex to understand and requires viewing self from a contemporary and traditional perspective to comprehend the self. Traditional perspectives such as dualism reveals the basis on which people conceptualize the self. Indeed, dualism often highlight the immaterial nature of self or associations connected with specific types of mental states (Lecture 12a, n.d, p. 12). Nonetheless, the exploration of the self’s nature shows that it is more complex than these traditional perspectives suggest. Thus, the concept of self is not easy to categorize within traditional paradigms. However, the emergence of alternative theories such as animalism, Lockean views, and illusionism, challenge our conventional understandings of the self.   

It is challenging to view the common characters of the traditional perspectives of the self through Animalism, Lockean Views, and Illusionism lens. These views open up nuances that question the coherence of traditional dualistic accounts. Animalism, for instance state that one is just a biological organism (Lecture 12b, n.d, p. 8). This refutes claims of an immaterial soul not identical to the body. On the other hand, Lockean views pose that the self is a person who is a certain set of appropriately related mental states. Through this, it introduces a separation into the identity and physical body, suggesting that one can persist even when the other one is not. Illusionism raises possibility that the self might be like convenient fiction, or an illusory construct, challenging the very foundation of our intuitive understanding of identity. 

Upon exploring alternative perspectives, it is clear that the roles typically assigned to the self are more complicated than originally thought. They do not support the perspective that the self is a referent of “I” or a subject of thoughts and experiences in general. Instead, they argue that the self’s nature is closely associated with larger philosophical questions on consciousness, personhood, and being. As an example, one can refer to the case of conjoined twins provided in Lecture 12b (p. 10-11) In the context of conjoined twins, the self definitely represents a perplexing entity. For example, one can challenge whether personal identity “ends” and “begins” in cases when physicality is shared, but individual experiences are psychologically different. In addition, thought experiments in current days make the concept of identity even more complex. The experiments naturally entail situations where a person’s brain can be arrayed in another shell or where two bodies can have identical states of the mind. Both scenarios defy understanding the self, making it impossible to highlight the consistent specifics of the interrelation between the self and the body. If there is an inherent ambiguity in these thought experiments, it is conditioned to reveal limitations of traditional conceptions in terms of the full variety of human identity. 

The emergence of illusionism challenges the very notion of a stable and coherent self. Illusionists question our most basic assumptions about identity and consciousness by putting forth the belief that the self is a mere useful fiction or an illusion (Lecture 12b, n.d, p. 33). Nevertheless, the perspective is far from mono-dimensional and finds additional critique in terms of the validity of the cogito argument by Descartes. 

In conclusion, I believe that the concept of self is complex to understand and categorize it. Although traditional views offer useful frameworks for understanding identity, it fails to capture the full scope of human experience and consciousness. They challenge us to reconsider deeply held assumptions and grapple with the profound mysteries of personal identity.