Argument Reconstruction: What it Means for a Conception of a Perception to be “Naïve”

Argument Reconstruction: What it Means for a Conception of a Perception to be “Naïve” 

“Raineri argues that naïve realism “should not be taken to simply articulate our ‘common-sense’ conception of perception, but rather the conception of experience we gain when we ‘pretheoretically’ introspect a veridical perceptual experience” (3645). The study deals with argument reconstruction, and it will reconstruct the first argument. 

The argument contains parts that need to be reconstructed like “pretheoretically,” and “veridical perceptual experience.” Raineri implies that veridical perceptual experience is one that individuals get when they phenomenally agree with their physical environment. Pretheoretically means an understanding that comes up before any theoretical considerations. Therefore, the author argues that one should take naïve realism to articulate the conception of experience individuals gain when there are genuine relations between the perceiver and objects that don’t depend on thinking or perceiving things and their features. Individuals need to be phenomenally in agreement with their environment to experience the concept of perception as accurate. Therefore, it is evident that Naïve Realism takes veridical perceptual experience to present certain features like transparency. It helps individuals perceive objects that do not depend on thinking and the elements they contain. In addition, it is said to have an actualism feature, where perceived things take on a manifestation that can't be explained by their nonexistence and therefore nonexistence. 

Raineri claims that one should not take naïve realism to articulate our “common sense” of perception because the objects of common-sense experience depend on thinking (Raineri, 2021). An example would be hallucinating that one’s house is on fire. In this case, there is an absence of the suitable object of experience, i.e., fire; however, one’s common-sense acts as a representation in informing the individual that their house is on fire. In Naïve realism, perception is related to a mental state; therefore, for one to perceive something, both the perceiver and the perceived object must be present. In this case, hallucination or just having illusions does not qualify as naïve realism since the perceived thing is absent. In hallucinations or having fantasies, the phenomenological claim is that they arise from a common factor that depends on thinking or perception. In this case, the perceiver is presented, but the perceived object is absent, making the perceiver rely on the “common sense” factor that the thing is present. Naïve realism deals with genuine relations that contain both transparency and actualism. Someone may decide to perceive something based on what their common sense is dictating them to do. However, this may fail to show a transparent and actual relationship between the perceiver and the perceived object, hence rendering the concept of perception not fulfill what naïve realism should be. Individuals should reconstruct Raineri’s argument to mean that naïve realism is based on introspective knowledge that an individual’s perception is articulated on the conception they experience that helps them agree with their physical environment. Therefore, it is wrong to think that a table is right in front of someone if, in a real sense, they don’t exist physically. It would mean that the person is conceiving the perception based on a common factor but not on a veridical perpetual experience. Therefore, people need to connect their perceptions to visible things, i.e., for naïve realism to be successful, both the perceiver and the perceived object and its features should be present. For instance, when one perceives an existence of a white table in a room, both the perceiver and the table and the exact color must be present for it to qualify as naïve realism. Otherwise, one would say that the perception is mind-dependent which is not the case in naïve realism. Naïve realism involves mind-independent objects, i.e., those that don’t require thinking. 

Reference

Raineri, C. (2021). What’s so naive about naive realism? Philosophical Studies, 178(11), 3637-3657. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01618-z